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Hegel and the Peircean ‘object’
Chris Barnham1
Abstract. Peirce’s semiotics is well known for advocating a triadic, rather than a dyadic, 
sign structure, but interpretations of how such a structure works in practice have varied 
considerably. This paper argues that the Peircean ‘object’ is central to understanding 
Peirce’s philosophical intent and that this element should be construed as a mediating 
element within the sign rather than as an originating source of it. This interpretation 
resonates with the fundamentally anti-dualist character of Peirce’s philosophy and it 
creates potential convergences with the medieval philosophy of Duns Scotus – which 
was so influential in Peirce’s thinking. Moreover, construal of the ‘object’ as a mediating 
entity within the sign highlights important parallels with Hegelian thought and the 
role of the ‘essence’ in the latter’s dialectics. It is argued, indeed, that Peirce’s triadic 
template for the sign has strong Hegelian roots. This substantially repositions Peirce’s 
semiotics; it becomes, as in Hegel’s dialectics, an account of concept formation. The 
over-arching framework in which this takes place, however, retains an adherence to 
Peirce’s empiricist background and so avoids the reliance on logic which is the defining 
characteristic of Hegel’s dialectical method.
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Introduction
There is, perhaps, no other term in Peircean thought that causes more confusion 
than the ‘object’ in the triadic structure of the sign. Given his rejection of dualism, 
the fact that Peirce uses this term when describing his sign structure seems to 
present the reader with a paradox. Is Peirce abandoning his anti-dualistic stance, 
or is he actually using the term in a manner that incorporates his rejection of 
dualism? In this paper, it will be argued that a Hegelian interpretation of the 
Peircean ‘object’ has the effect of positioning it within the Peircean sign, and in a 
role that parallels the ‘Essence’ in Hegelian dialectics. This, in turn, allows us to 
view Peirce’s semiotics as a post-Hegelian endeavour to understand the activity of 
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concept formation. Signs, in this construal, are not simply entities that we perceive 
and which we interpret – they become the very mechanisms through which we 
form our concepts.
Interpretations of Peirce’s sign structure
Before embarking upon a discussion of the nature of the Peircean ‘object’, we 
should first evaluate the underlying structure of the Peircean sign itself. The 
central issue here is how the three elements of the sign structure relate to one 
another. One might assume that this would be a settled issue in the literature, but 
this is, in fact, far from being the case. As Short observes, “there is considerable 
trouble over how the relation of object to sign and sign to interpretant is to be 
conceived” (Short 2007: 165). In this context, we should begin by considering 
the various interpretations of his sign structure that emerge in the secondary 
literature.
The most common construal places the Peircean sign within a triadic 
relation ship, but, critically, it also views the sign itself as only one element of that 
relationship:
Object – Sign – Interpretant
An example of this interpretation is Jappy’s account of Peirce. His version of the 
Peircean sign construes the object as the sign’s source – and he positions the object 
as something ‘behind’ the sign “as an ‘absent’ entity which it represents” (Jappy 
2013: 2). And Jappy goes on to describe semiosis as follows: “The dynamics of 
semiosis [...] can now be illustrated schematically [...] where the arrows indicate 
the direction of the semiotic determination – the semiotic ‘determination flow’, so 
to speak – from the object to the interpretant via the sign” (Jappy 2013: 6).
 This interpretation of the sign structure has several important effects. Firstly, 
because the sign is placed between the object and the mind, it is often viewed as 
being caused by the object. De Waal, for example, talks of the sign being compelled 
by the object (De Waal 2013: 87). Liszka (1996: 21), likewise, argues that there 
is a sense of compulsion in the ‘dynamic object’: “The dynamic object can be 
considered as the dynamism, the machine that drives the semiotic process; it is 
what compels the sign”.
 Secondly, such interpretations tend to construe the sign itself as the experiential 
link between an object (‘behind’ the sign) and the mind. The sign acts, as a result, 
rather like a Humean ‘sense impression’, or as a ‘communication vehicle’ providing 
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information about the object which it ‘represents’, or which it ‘stands for’ (Forster 
2011: 81). This leads to the sign being viewed as something that needs to be 
‘deciphered’, as Brier suggests, with the object construed as its reference point: “For 
Peirce, signs always consist of a primary sign (Representamen), the object that is 
referred to (Object), and an interpreter (Interpretant) who deciphers the sign in 
relation to the historical processes of life and culture” (Brier 2008: 284).
 In some accounts, commentators call the sign, in this specific role, by 
another term  – the ‘representamen’. For example, Smith outlines a similar 
tria dic relationship to the one above, but with the ‘sign’ now described as the 
‘representa men’: “In an abstract depiction of the sign, the representamen is 
determined by the object and in turn determines the interpretant” (Smith 
2010: 38–9). Peirce, however, is not always consistent with his use of the term 
‘representamen’. As Deledalle points out, Peirce employs it until 1873, then he 
drops it until 1895, and then it is re-adopted until 1903, when it is abandoned 
once again (Deledalle 1992: 294). We will return to the conflation of these two 
terms shortly.
 Elsewhere in the literature there is also another, and less common, inter-
pretation of the Peircean sign structure. This adopts an alternative relationship 
between the three elements:
Object – Interpretant – Sign
In this construal, Ma, for example, suggests that the interpretant should be placed 
in the middle of the triadic relationship, rather than as its concluding element: 
“The mediatory effect of the interpretant in the sign–object relation is predicated 
on the meaning of a sign being tied to the cultural, historical milieu within which 
the sign is understood” (Ma 2014: 379). And this model echoes the earlier view 
of Ogden and Richards who adopt a triadic structure when they place ‘thought or 
reference’ (in otherwords, the act of meaning creation) in between the ‘referent’ 
(e.g. the ‘object’) and the ‘symbol’ (e.g. the sign) (Ogden, Richards 1989: 11). More 
recently, Semetsky follows a similar line of argument, suggesting that Peirce’s 
interpretant should be positioned between the representamen and the object: “His 
triadic conception affirms the dynamic character of signs and the ubiquitous role 
of this mediating component called interpretant as the included Third between 
a sign per se (alternatively called a representamen) and its object or referent” 
(Semetsky 2015: 17). In this second interpretation of the sign, meaning is created 
through the interpretant. This structure is clearly different from the first model of 
the sign that we considered. However, both models still place the ‘object’ outside 
of the sign, and also at the beginning of the signification process.
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 Reading Peirce, there certainly seems to be considerable evidence for the first 
construal of his sign structure – hereafter referred to as the ‘received view’. Peirce 
states, for example:
I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which mediates 
between an object and an interpretant; since it is both determined by the object 
relatively to the interpretant, and determines the interpretant in reference to the 
object, in such wise as to cause the interpretant to be determined by the object 
through the mediation of this ‘sign’. (EP 2: 410)
This passage clearly construes the ‘object’ as the determining element in the 
signification process – with the sign positioned in between the object and the 
interpretant. But we should now assess whether this ‘received view’ is, in fact, the 
correct interpretation of Peirce’s triadic sign structure.
Against the ‘received’ view of Peirce’s sign structure
A deeper understanding of Peirce’s philosophy raises questions as to whether the 
received view of his sign structure is, in fact, the correct one. For this reason, we 
must consider, very briefly, some other aspects of Peirce’s broader philosophy.
 Firstly, Peirce was a critic of dualism throughout his career. Indeed, he was so 
assured in this view that he treated his rejection of Cartesian Dualism as almost 
a settled issue: “The old dualistic notion of mind and matter, so prominent in 
Cartesianism, as two radically different kinds of substance, will hardly find 
defenders today” (EP 1: 292). 
 It would be surprising in this context, therefore, to find Peirce advocating an 
account of sign structure that seems to institutionalize such dualism. It would 
be a disservice to Peirce to suggest that he is simply being inconsistent here. We 
should establish, instead, how his actual use of the term ‘object’ can possibly work 
alongside his rejection of dualism.
 Secondly, the “received” account of his sign structure takes little account of 
Peirce’s broader philosophy of perception. Peirce insists that our perceptions are 
‘vagues’ (EP 2: 324) and it is also clear that he rejects ‘Kantian intuitionism’ (EP 1: 
113). This means that, for Peirce, our perceptions cannot provide us with direct 
(and non-inferential) knowledge. In these circumstances, it is difficult to see how 
signs can operate in the manner advocated by the ‘received’ view. A sign cannot 
provide us with direct information about a noumenal ‘object’ ‘behind’ it if its 
perceptual element is ‘vague’. This aspect of Peirce’s broader philosophical position 
is critical in understanding how he views the role of the ‘object’ in the sign. Peirce 
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believes that, when we are confronted with indeterminacy in our perceptual field, 
our mind attempts to deal with this by ‘picking out’ things from the perceptual 
continuum. This is the first step in transforming our initially indeterminate 
perceptions into more ‘determinant’ forms of knowledge.
 At the centre of this process is the ‘object’ itself. This is created, for Peirce, as 
the mind ‘picks out’ something from the perceptual field. The Peircean ‘object’, 
therefore, is formed by the mind in creating a sign. In a letter to William James, 
for example, Peirce confirms this interpretation: “[...] the Object is brought into 
existence by the Sign” (EP 2: 493), and “The Object of a Sign may be something to 
be created by the Sign” (EP 2: 493). In this construal, it is sign action itself which 
creates the ‘object’ – and not the other way around. The object, created within 
the sign, now enjoys a mediating role because the sign is created in between the 
initial perception (the ‘vague’ representamen) and its signification in the mind (the 
interpretant).
 Thirdly, this has important implications for how we actually understand 
Peirce’s statements about the sign. Many of the passages where Peirce seems to 
suggest that the ‘object’ determines the sign are open to the challenge that he is, 
in fact, discussing the whole triadic relationship of the sign structure – rather than 
just the experiential element of the sign. The quotation at EP 2: 410, indeed, comes 
from a period (1907) when Peirce had dropped the term ‘representamen’. As such, 
Peirce is not suggesting that the interpretant is determined by the object via the 
sign (the ‘received view’), but rather that the whole triadic relationship of the sign 
(including the ‘object’ within it) determines the interpretant.
 In support of this view, it is clear that Peirce’s usage of the term ‘representamen’ 
is different from that of the ‘sign’. The former is used by Peirce to describe the 
‘vague’ experience from which the sign takes a “representative quality” (EP 2: 273). 
In contrast, the ‘sign’ involves the whole triadic structure. If this were not the 
case, we would find passages in Peirce where he states that the object determines 
the representamen – and these do not seem to be present in his work. Indeed, 
the slightly differing roles of the two terms (the sign and representamen) may 
also explain why Peirce dropped the latter for long periods of his career. It has a 
certain degree of superfluity given that the ‘object’ fixes the relevant parts of the 
perceptual continuum in the very formation of a sign.
 Fourthly, on occasions Peirce clearly describes the ‘object’ – at least in one of its 
forms – as a mediating element. In a letter to Lady Welby, he states:
It is usual and proper to distinguish two Objects of a Sign, the Mediate without, 
and the Immediate within the Sign. Its Interpretant is all that the Sign conveys: 
acquaintance with its Object must be gained by collateral experience. Th e Mediate 
106 Chris Barnham
Object is the Object outside of the sign; I call it the Dynamoid Object. Th e Sign 
must indicate it by a hint; and this hint, or its substance, is the Immediate Object. 
(EP 2: 480)
This passage clearly indicates that there is an object within the Peircean sign – 
something that the ‘received’ view of the sign structure tends to ignore. We will 
discuss, later, how the ‘immediate’ and the ‘dynamical’ objects are related to each 
other. In brief summary, however, the ‘immediate object’ is the ‘object’ as it is 
initially ‘fixed’ in the act of signification. This is why it is “within the sign”. As the 
‘object’ develops and evolves, however, it forms a ‘dynamical’ object.
 One question, however, is why does Peirce, in the passage above, describe 
the ‘dynamical’ object as “without” the sign? The answer resides in the fact that 
the ‘dynamical object’ is always evolving into a ‘third’. It is becoming, in Peirce’s 
phrase, a form of “concrete reasonableness” (CP 5.3). And, as this status evolves, it 
becomes a mediating entity. Peirce explains – combining ‘mediation’ and ‘thirdness’ 
as follows:
Now Th irdness is nothing but the character of an object which embodies Between -
 ness or Mediation in its simplest and most rudimentary form; and I use it as the 
name of that element of the phenomenon which is predominant wherever Media-
tion is predominant, and which reaches its fullness in Representation. (EP 2: 183)
In summary, the Peircean sign structure, proposed here, suggests that the ‘object’ 
is, firstly, within the sign; secondly, it is created in the act of signification as the 
mind ‘fixes’ the ‘object’; and, thirdly, the ‘object’ determines the interpretant simply 
because the ‘object’ is part of the whole of the triadic structure of the sign. As such, 
we can now envisage a structure for the Peircean sign which, beneficially, also 
gives the representamen a distinct role in the overall triadic relationship:
ZĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂŵĞŶʹ KďũĞĐƚ ʹ /ŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂŶƚ
^/'E
Peirce describes this structure as follows:
A Representamen is the First Correlate of a triadic relation, the Second Correlate 
being termed its Object, and the possible Th ird Correlate being termed its 
Interpretant, by which triadic relation the possible Interpretant is determined to 
be the First Correlate of the same triadic relation to the same Object, and for some 
possible Interpretant. (CP 2.242)
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Significantly, Peirce confirms the mediating role of the ‘object’ in this triadic sign 
structure a few paragraphs before this passage, stating: “The Second Correlate is 
that one of the three which is regarded as of middling complexity […]” (CP 2.237, 
my italics, C. B.).
The ‘object’: the medieval and Kantian models
Is there any evidence, within the history of philosophy, that would support the 
claim that the ‘object’ is, in fact, both within the sign, and that it has a mediating 
role?
 It is widely acknowledged that Peirce was strongly influenced by Duns Scotus 
(Boler 1963: 145–165). In his philosophy, we find the term ‘object’ being used in 
precisely this mediating role – unencumbered by any dualist assumptions which 
are modern in origin. In Duns Scotus’s view, individual sense data are the ‘objects’ 
of the senses (e.g. colour is an ‘object’ of sight) (Lagerlund 2007: 11–32). Thus, 
in order to understand an ‘object’, as it might exist in reality, it is necessary to 
establish an additional, and mediating, ‘object’, which forms within the mind. 
As Pasnau (2003: 289) explains, it is this second ‘object’ that renders something 
cognizable:
He [Scotus] gladly allows that the external object is present  – that it has real 
presence – and that it is the effi  cient cause of the cognitive act. Still Scotus insists 
that this is not enough to account for cognition. Another kind of presence is 
needed, the presence of the object-as-cognized. 
It is this medieval “object-as-cognized” that Peirce adopts in his triadic sign 
structure. And this ‘object’, because it is a mental construction, also opens up the 
possibility of developing concepts of things that we have not yet encountered:
Of course, the object in itself can be present and can make an impression on our 
cognitive faculties. But that does not explain cognition: that sort of relationship 
obtains throughout the natural world, between the sun and a rock, or waves and a 
beach. To account for the special sort of relationship at work in cognition, Scotus 
appeals to a further kind of presence [...]. It is this sort of presence, here said to be 
brought about through species, that is required for the intentional relationships 
found in cognition. Th e need for this special kind of presence is more clear in 
cases in which the object of thought is not itself present. Even here, thought has a 
kind of relationship to an object: one must be thinking about something. But since 
the object has no real presence, and so exerts no causal infl uence, the relationship 
is entirely conceptual. (Pasnau 2003: 289–290)
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For Duns Scotus, therefore, an act of cognition must involve an ‘object-as-
cognized’. We might, for our purposes, call it an ‘object of thought’. And, im-
portantly, this mental entity can be ‘entirely conceptual’. Tweedale confirms this 
view in a book with a sub-title which explicitly mentions the role of ‘objects of 
thought’ in medieval philosophy:
Toward the end of the thirteenth century a distinction between esse subjectivum 
and esse objectivum comes into common usage among the scholastics. Perhaps 
the fi rst thinker to make heavy use of it is John Duns Scotus. Th e idea here is 
that something might have two ways of existing: (1) a real existence in no way 
dependent on being the object of any mental act or state; (2) existence as an 
object of some mental act or state. Th e former is esse subjectivum; the latter, esse 
objectivum. Something can have either of these without the other, or both at once. 
(Tweedale 2007: 73)
It is, of course, of relevance that Peirce confirms that his use of the term ‘object’ 
derives from medieval philosophy. In a letter to Lady Welby, he states: “I use the 
term ‘object’ in the sense in which obiectum was first made a substantive early 
in the XIIIth century; and when I use the word without adding ‘of ’ what I am 
speaking of the object, I mean anything that comes before thought or the mind in 
any usual sense” (Peirce 1977: 69).
 Elsewhere, Maritain explains that the notion of something becoming an ‘object 
of thought’ is still being used several centuries later. Discussing the work of the 
17th-century philosopher, John Poinsot, he notes the ‘object’ is something that is 
“brought into the womb of the mind”. Significantly for our discussion, he sees this 
activity as involving the ‘object’ evolving into a mediating ‘concept’:
Th e concept is a mediator; by and in it the object is brought into the womb of 
the mind in the state of ultimate intellectual actuation. Th us, our intellect attains 
things only according as its concepts render them present to it. Th e manner of 
our understanding corresponds to the more-or-less complete, or the more-or-less 
defective way in which the thing is objectifi ed in the concept. (Maritain 1995: 416)
Later in the history of philosophy, we find the notion of an ‘object of thought’ is 
still being used by Kant. In his famous passage on ‘The Idea of a Transcendental 
Logic’, Kant (2007[1781]: 85–86) states:
We are so constituted that our intuition can never be other than sensible; that 
is, it contains only the mode in which we are aff ected by objects. Th e faculty, 
on the contrary, which enables us to think the object of sensible intuition is the 
understanding. Neither of these properties is to be preferred to the other. Without 
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sensibility no object would be given to us, without understanding no object would 
be thought. Th oughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are 
blind. 
Here Kant talks of ‘the object of the sensible intuition’ and he argues that “without 
understanding no object would be thought”. He is clearly using the term ‘object’ 
here as something that is created by the mind. And Peirce highlights this Kantian 
usage, confirming that he adopts the same perspective, and clearly stating that 
the ‘object’ should be seen as “the normal product of mental action” and not the 
cause of it:
Indeed, what Kant called his Copernican step was precisely the passage from the 
nominalistic to the realistic view of reality. It was the essence of his philosophy 
to regard the real object as determined by the mind. Th at was nothing else than 
to consider every conception and intuition which enters necessarily into the 
experience of an object, and which is not transitory and accidental, as having 
objective validity. In short, it was to regard the reality as the normal product of 
mental action, and not as the incognizable cause of it. (EP 1: 90–91)
Elsewhere, Kant also agrees with Peirce that there exists a mediating (and third) 
element involved in cognition – in between the intellect and ‘the sensible’. Kant 
asks: “How, then, can the intuition be subsumed under the concept, or how can 
the categories be applied to appearances?” (Kant 2007[1781]: 176). His answer, a 
few lines later, is that:
In our case there must be some third thing, which must be homogeneous on 
the one side with the category, and on the other with the appearance, and which 
thus renders the application of the former to the latter possible. Th is mediating 
representation must be pure (that is free from all that is empirical), and yet be 
intellectual on the one side, and sensible on the other. Such a representation is the 
transcendental schema. (Kant 2007[1781]: 176–177)
Here Kant retains the view of Duns Scotus that cognition involves three elements, 
and that mediation is required for an act of cognition to take place. It is of some 
considerable significance, however, that Kant calls this mediating element a 
‘schema’ – a term that Eco (1999: 80–84) explores in his discussion of the icon. 
The exact relationship between the Peircean icon and his ‘object’ falls, however, 
outside the scope of the current paper.
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The ‘object’: the Hegelian model
Unsurprisingly, Kant’s usage of the ‘object’ is also found in later German Idealism 
with Hegel using the term in a similar manner. Again, writing only a few decades 
before Peirce, the ‘object’ is described by Hegel as something created by the mind: 
“The real nature of the object is brought to light in reflection; but it is no less true 
that this exertion of thought is my act. If this be so, the real nature is a product of 
my mind, in its character of thinking subject [...]” (Hegel 2014[1892]: 26). As such, 
Hegel views the ‘object of thought’ as something that develops within the mind. In 
his Phenomenology of Spirit, he argues that, when consciousness is confronted with 
reality in an unexpected form, it is the ‘object’ itself that changes:
If the comparison shows that these two moments do not correspond to one 
another, it would seem that consciousness must alter its knowledge to make it 
conform to the object. But, in fact, in the alteration of the knowledge, the object 
alters for it too, for the knowledge that was present was essentially a knowledge 
of the object: as the knowledge changes, so too does the object, for it essentially 
belonged to this knowledge. (Hegel 1977: 54)
In this context, Hegel also makes a critical (and now familiar) distinction between 
two types of ‘object’. Inwood (1992: 204) highlights that Hegel uses two words in 
German which are both commonly translated as ‘object’:
He [Hegel] stresses the etymology of Gegenstand more than that of Objekt, so that 
a Gegenstand is essentially and immediately an object of knowledge etc, whilst 
an Objekt is at least initially independent. A Gegenstand is an intentional object 
whilst an Objekt is a real object. [...] A Gegenstand, by contrast, may be the object 
of a simple form of consciousness, such as sense certainty, which is not yet a fully-
fl edged subject. 
This parallels the distinction that we have observed in Peirce. Deely makes a 
similar distinction between ‘objects’ (of thought) and ‘things’. He argues: “Objects 
as such exist only in relation to a knower, a being that is aware or virtually aware 
of them; whereas ‘things’ by definition are what they are regardless of whether 
anyone is aware of them or not” (Deely 2008: 26–7). In Hegelian thought the 
‘object’ (Gegenstand) is thus construed as an entity, within the mind, which 
develops in a way that reflects the ‘object’ (Objekt) that may, or may not, exist 
(‘outside’) in reality. The ‘Gegenstand’ is, in Hegelian guise, the ‘object-as-cognized’, 
or the ‘object of thought’.
 This historical background provides us with a useful way of understanding 
the role of the ‘object’ in the Peircean sign. This can also be seen more explicitly, 
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however, if we consider the way in which Hegel views the overall development of 
the concept.
 Using his own triadic structure of ‘Being’, ‘Essence’, and ‘Notion’, Hegel argues 
that the mind is initially confronted with an indeterminacy of ‘Being’ (Hegel 
2014[1892]: 101). Hegel proposes that the human mind then ‘posits’ an ‘Essence’ 
as an imperfect approximation of that reality in order to make sense of it. Over 
time, this Essence evolves through the logical workings of dialectics (Hegel 
2014[1892]: 133–186). This process brings the ‘Essence’ closer and closer to a true 
‘representation’ of reality. As such, and in Hegelian terms, the ‘Gegenstand’ thus 
becomes more and more like the ‘Objekt’. And, at the same time, the evolving 
Essence becomes embedded in a web of other concepts (‘Notions’) that mutually 
define each other. This final complex of interrelated concepts Hegel calls the 
‘Absolute Idea’ (Hegel 2014[1892]: 186–246).
 In this context, the Hegelian ‘Essence’ has a number of important characteristics 
which are relevant to our current discussion of Peirce. It acts as a mediating entity 
between the mind and our ‘indeterminate’ perception, it is created by the mind, it 
brings the ‘object’ into the ‘womb of the mind’, and it also has the capacity to evolve 
over time. Critically, it is through this process that Hegel believes the human mind 
is able to create, and then develop, the concepts that enable us to understand our 
world.
 This paper proposes that the same project is at the heart of Peircean semiotics. 
Peircean signs are frequently understood in the literature as providing information 
about the ‘objects’ that initiate them, or which are ‘behind’ them. In contrast, it is 
argued here that the purpose of Peircean signs is, in fact, to facilitate the evolution 
of effective concepts. In this context, the mediating ‘object of thought’ within 
the Peircean sign can be viewed as a parallel of the Hegelian ‘Essence’. In Peirce’s 
account of perception, the ‘representamen’ is only capable of providing us with 
sensory ‘vagues’ (CP 7.632). This part of the Peircean sign, therefore, corresponds 
to Hegel’s ‘Being’. As such, the representamen is not a ‘sign vehicle’, but rather a 
source of initial perceptual ‘indeterminacy’. The ‘immediate object’, within the 
sign, serves to ‘fix’ an element of this ‘indeterminacy’ and it acts as a hypothesis of 
what the real ‘object’ may eventually turn out to be. As this ‘object’ evolves (via sign 
action – rather than through Hegelian dialectics) it progressively ‘determines’ the 
meaning of the third component of the sign – the interpretant. This third element 
is the equivalent of the Hegelian ‘Notion’. Peirce’s semiotics can thus be reframed as 
the very process through which we form our empirical concepts – and the ‘object’ 
within the sign is the locus of such development.
 This, however, brings us to the question of how such evolution takes place – 
and the idea of ‘determination’ within the structure of the sign.
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‘Determination’ in the Peircean sign
Peirce’s concept of ‘determination’ is another term that leads to confusion in the 
secondary literature. Peirce often uses it in his definitions of the sign. We have 
already noted one instance of this, but here is a further example with an indication 
(significantly in German this time) of what it may entail:
A Sign is a Cognizable that, on the one hand, is so determined (i.e. specialized, 
bestimmt) by something other than itself, called its Object [...]. while, on the other 
hand, it so determines some actual or potential Mind, the determination whereof 
I term the Interpretant created by the Sign, that that Interpreting Mind is therein 
determined mediately by the Object. (EP 2: 492)
This passage is, again, notable in placing the object in a mediating role. However, 
it can still be read as suggesting that Peirce views ‘determination’ as meaning being 
‘caused by’. We have already noted interpretations of the Peircean sign that cast 
the ‘object’ an initiating element of the sign and it is clearly tempting to reach for 
this particular conclusion. Hookway, for example, when explaining the latter, uses 
the example of some ‘stripped bark’: “The stripped bark, here, is the sign; as its 
object we can take the deer or the fact that there have been deer nearby; and the 
interpretant is our thought that there are deer nearby” (Hookway 1985: 122). In 
this passage, Hookway sees the deer as the ‘object’ and as the cause that leads to 
the bark being stripped (the sign).
 Short, however, is more nuanced in his discussion of ‘determination’. He fully 
recognizes the importance of the term to Peirce’s philosophy and he devotes 
several pages to its meaning. Critically, he recognizes (as quoted above) that Peirce 
sometimes uses the German word ‘bestimmt’, and that its meaning is “to limit as in 
‘The water’s edge determines where your property ends’” (Short 2007: 167). Short, 
however, still insists that “each object limits, or determines, what may be a sign 
of it, and each sign similarly determines what may be an interpretant of it” (Short 
2007: 167). Short, therefore, is correct in identifying the sense of ‘limiting’ in the 
idea of ‘determination’, but he still retains a causal interpretation of it. In his view, 
objects have a determining role in relation to signs because they causally limit 
“what may be a sign of ” each one.
 However, in order to fully understand the true import of the term ‘deter-
mination’, we need to evaluate this term in relation to Peirce’s philosophy of 
perception. Echoing Hegel once more, Peirce argues that what we perceive are 
‘percepts’ and that these are intrinsically “vague” (CP 7.619). These percepts form 
the cornerstone of his rejection of Kantian ‘intuitionism’ which assumes that we 
know the sense content of our perceptions (EP 2: 155). Peirce goes on to argue that 
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our ‘perceptual judgments’ take our ‘percepts’ and categorize them as members of 
classes (CP 7.632). As a result, we are only able to perceive something as something 
(Gallie 1952: 67) and as the member of a putative class. It follows from this that 
our ‘perceptual judgments’ are ‘classes’ awaiting further determination (CP 7.392).
 With this theoretical background in place, the role of ‘determination’ in 
Peircean sign development now becomes much clearer. And the ‘object’, within 
the sign, now has a clear role to play; it encapsulates a putative identity (‘posited’ 
by the mind) which is more ‘determinate’ than the originating ‘vague’ in the 
representamen. In other words, the ‘object’ does not limit the representamen by 
restricting the possible meanings that can be represented by it. Instead, the ‘object’ 
limits the sign by ‘picking out’ a key element from the perceptual field. And it does 
this in a manner that parallels the Hegelian Essence. Of course, this procedure is 
never entirely accurate enough to make the ‘object’ completely ‘determined’ (i.e. 
an accurate representation of reality itself), but the formation of the ‘object’ within 
the sign marks the very beginning of concept formation. As Peirce puts it: “[…] 
thoughts are determinations of the mind” (CP 4.582).
 On one occasion, Peirce made explicit the relationship between ‘determination’ 
and ‘fixing’ in a letter entitled “What is meant by determined”. And here he also 
makes a reference to Hegel:
Perhaps, therefore, I shall do well to state more fully than I did before, the manner 
in which I understand Hegel (in common with all other logicians) to use them. 
Possibly, the original signifi cation of bestimmt was ‘settled by vote’; or it may have 
been ‘pitched to a key’. Th us, its origin was quite diff erent from that of ‘determined’, 
yet I believe that as philosophical terms their equivalence is exact. In general, they 
mean ‘fi xed to be this (or thus), in contradistinction to being this, that, or the other 
(or in some way or other). (W 2: 155–6)
Here, the idea of ‘determination’ is linked to the idea of ‘fixing’. As we have seen, it 
plays a central role in Peirce’s work (EP 1: 109–123).
 If we also place this Peircean account of ‘determination’ in an historical context, 
we find that it is widespread in late-18th-century philosophy. Kant uses the verb 
‘determine’ in the Critique of Pure Reason as follows (and note, again, his use of the 
term ‘object’):
Th e pure concepts of the understanding refer, through the mere understanding, 
to objects of intuition in general, whether it be our own intuition or any other, 
provided only that it is sensible intuition. But the concepts are, for this very 
reason, mere forms of thought, through which as yet no determinate object is 
known. (Kant 2007[1781]: 147)
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Forty years later, Hegel is still using the idea of ‘determination’ to refer to the 
way in which concepts develop in the mind. He states: “What are called concepts, 
and indeed determinate concepts, e.g. man, house, animal etc, are simple deter-
minations and abstracted representations” (Hegel 1991[1830]: 242).
 If the ‘object’ initially ‘fixes’ elements of the representamen we are still left, 
however, with a secondary question as to how the ‘object’ continues to evolve 
within the sign. If the mind is able to ‘fix’ a putative identity in the initial stage 
of sign development, how does this process subsequently develop? Hegel argues 
that his Essence evolves through dialectics. For Peirce, however, it is reality itself 
which plays the critical role in further determining the nature of the ‘object’. And 
this on-going process takes place through his category of ‘secondness’.
 Commentators are sometimes misled by Peirce’s notion of secondness and 
they can interpret it as a form of ‘objectivity’  – often encouraged by Peirce’s 
description of it as “a hard fact” (EP 1: 249). This leads to various assertions such 
as “objectivity is the definition of secondness” (Olteanu 2015: 267), or “secondness 
represents causality and reactance” (Smith 2010: 39). Murphey comes much closer 
to the underlying nature of secondness when he describes it as “upagainstness” 
(Murphey 1993: 373). Secondness is the category that limits our ‘vague’ perceptions 
(‘firsts’) and makes it clear to us that our ‘indeterminate’ perceptions (and the 
misplaced thoughts that they may have encouraged) have boundaries in the real 
world. As such, the action of secondness is intimately connected, for Peirce, with 
his notion of ‘determination’. Fundamentally, the category of secondness acts to 
limit the indeterminate nature of our perceptions – including those caught up in 
signification. Our day to day experience of the world can, therefore, be construed 
as an on-going ‘determination of belief ’:
Experience is that determination of belief and cognition generally which the 
course of life has forced on man. One may lie about it; but one cannot escape the 
fact that some things are forced upon his cognition. Th ere is the element of brute 
force, existing whether you opine it exists or not. (CP 2.138)
And, elsewhere, Peirce highlights the action of secondness in the process of 
determination itself:
A genus characterised by Reaction will, by determination of its essential character, 
split into two species, one a species where secondness is strong, the other a species 
where the secondness is weak, and the strong species will subdivide into two 
that will be similarly related, without any corresponding subdivision of the weak 
species. (CP 5.69)
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Therefore, the ‘object’, within the sign, evolves through the action of secondness. 
Hegel saw this process as taking place on a dialectical basis; but Peirce introduces 
an empirical element. And this is, of course, precisely where Peirce believes his 
philosophy diverges from Hegelian thought:
Th e capital error of Hegel which permeates his whole system in every part of 
it is that he almost altogether ignores the ‘Outward Clash’. Besides the lower 
consciousness of feeling and the higher consciousness of nutrition, this direct 
consciousness of hitting and of getting hit enters into all cognition and serves to 
make it mean something real. (EP 1: 233)
When Hegel tells me that thought has three stages, that of naïve acceptance, that 
of reaction and criticism, and that of rational conviction; in a general sense, I 
agree to it […]. But be that as it may, the idea that the mere reaction of assent 
and doubt, the mere play of thought, the heat-lightening of the brain, is going to 
settle anything in this real world to which we appertain, – such an idea only shows 
again how the Hegelians overlook the facts of volitional action and reaction in the 
development of thought. I fi nd myself in a world of forces which act upon me, and 
it is they and not the logical transformations of my thought which determine what 
I shall ultimately believe. (EP 1: 237)
These comments, and his wider discussion of Hegel in “On Phenomenology” (EP 
2: 145–159), can easily suggest that Peirce is a whole-hearted critic of Hegel. But 
this would overlook the much stronger convergences between their two systems of 
thought. Peirce openly agrees, for example, that his philosophy shares similarities 
with that of Hegel and that his categories “agree substantially” with Hegel’s “three 
moments” (CP 2.87). But what Peirce seeks to establish is an account of concept 
development based on sign action, rather than dialectical logic, and so he adopts 
the terminology of the ‘representamen’, the ‘object’, and the ‘interpretant’ – instead 
of Hegel’s ‘Being’, ‘Essence’ and ‘Notion’.
 In summary, once we have established that the Peircean ‘object’ enjoys a 
‘mediating’ position within the sign – in between the representamen and the 
interpretant (but still within the overall structure of the Peircean sign) – we can 
discern certain parallels with the Hegelian Essence. As noted, this interpretation 
of the mediating ‘object’ also has roots in medieval, and Kantian, interpretations of 
the ‘object’. These posit an ‘object of thought’ which initiates and facilitates concept 
development. In this mediating position, the object still determines the sign – but 
it does so because the ‘object’ is what ‘fixes’ (and develops) part of the perceptual 
field – thereby creating sign action.
 And, if this interpretation is accepted, then it has the significant effect of 
placing Peircean semiotics within a Hegelian framework that construes his sign 
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theory in a very different light. Signs become the very mechanisms through 
which we build our empirical concepts and develop increasingly valid knowledge 
of the world. They are, therefore, at some theoretical distance from the kind of 
perspectives that insist that semiotics is “the discipline studying everything which 
can be used in order to lie” (Eco 1976: 7).
Leibniz: the immediate and dynamical objects
We have already noted the distinction that Peirce makes between the ‘immediate’ 
and the ‘dynamical’ objects. But if we look further, we can also identify the origins 
of these two ‘objects’ in the philosophy of Leibniz. A number of commentators 
have already highlighted the influence of Leibniz on Peirce (e.g. Chevalier 2013: 
1–22; Bellucci 2013: 331–356; Bellucci 2015: 399–418) and one Leibniz scholar 
has, indeed, gone so far as to state that Peirce “knew Leibniz better than any other 
American of his time” (Loemker 1989: 57). But we will now consider how Leibniz 
may have influenced Peirce’s formulation of his ‘immediate’ and ‘dynamical’ 
objects. In particular, Leibniz offers us insight into how these two ‘objects’ are 
related to each other in a non-dualistic framework, how the ‘dynamical object’ 
is able to evolve from the ‘immediate object’, and what kind of ‘reality’ is created 
in this process. This Leibnizian influence can also be discerned in Hegel, and the 
latter’s construal of the kind of reality that is formed through dialecticism.
 In Leibniz’s philosophy, the Universe comprises a web of interrelating ‘monads’ 
which are defined entirely by their relationships with each other. This means that 
monads do not exist and have relationships with each other – instead, they are 
defined by their relationships with each other. In this model, the human soul is 
construed by Leibniz as constituting just one particular kind of ‘monad’ within the 
web of Creation. As such, the human soul is not set aside from reality (and looking 
in upon it in a “sideways” fashion (McDowell 1994: 34)). Rather, it is immersed in 
reality and it forms part of it. This echoes the Peircean view that “we ought to say 
that we are in signs and not that signs are in us” (CP 5.289). In this interpretation 
of reality, every monad is connected, however remotely, to every other monad and 
so is partially defined by it. As Leibniz (1951[1714]: 523) states:
Th e world is a plenum, everything is connected and each body acts upon every 
other body, more or less, according to the distance, and by reaction is itself 
aff ected thereby; it follows that each monad is a living mirror, or endowed with an 
internal activity, representative according to its point of view of the universe, and 
as regulated as the universe itself. 
 Hegel and the Peircean ‘object’ 117
In Leibniz’s system, of course, it is assumed that every ‘monad’ is known by God. 
This means that the relationships between the monads (both potential and actual) 
are accessible to the Divine Mind in a structure of “Pre-Established Harmony” 
(Leibniz 1951[1705]: 190–199) which defines both their identities and their 
relationships with each other. By the 19th century this theistic option is not open 
to Hegel; but we find that he still retains the same underlying Leibnizian template:
Existence is the immediate unity of refl ection-into-self and refl ection-into-
another. It follows from this that existence is the indefi nite multitude of existents 
as refl ected-into-themselves, which at the same time equally throw light upon 
one another,  – which, in short, are co-relative, and form a world of reciprocal 
dependence and of infi nite interconnection between grounds and consequents. 
(Hegel 2014[1892]: 149)
Critically, however, this Hegelian system is created by the human mind through 
the process of concept formation itself. It follows that our concepts are necessarily 
interrelated with each other. As Inwood notes: “[...] each concept is different from 
the other in the system and is determined by its relationships to them, by its place 
within the system” (Inwood 1983: 173).
 If we accept that our concepts are interrelated in this manner, then it follows 
that, from any point within the web of conceptual connections, we can only 
achieve limited understanding of these relationships. In such circumstances, we 
can only ever attain partial levels of comprehension of potential concepts. Leibniz 
sees this partial understanding as resulting in ‘nominal definitions’; and these 
equate with Hegel’s ‘Gegenstand’. They are, of course, provisional understandings 
and they can always be revised in accordance with further experience. In his New 
Essays Concerning Human Understanding Leibniz (1996: 299–300) writes:
So there is a kind of redundancy in our perceptions of sensible qualities as well as 
of sensible portions of matter: it consists in the fact that we have more than one 
notion of a single subject. Gold can be nominally defi ned in various ways – it can 
be the heaviest body we have, the most malleable, a fusible body which resists 
cupellation and aquafortis, etc. Each of these marks is sound, and suffi  ces for the 
recognition of gold: provisionally, at least, and in the present state of the bodies 
around us [...]. So one can say [...] that in matters where we have only the empiric’s 
kind of knowledge our defi nitions are all merely provisional. 
These ‘nominal definitions’ are contrasted by Leibniz with what he calls ‘real 
definitions’ which would give us, if they were ever achieved, complete knowledge 
of a thing. Leibniz openly acknowledges that this level of comprehension is only 
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possible in the mind of God, although he insists it is something that the human 
knowledge should always aspire to.
 I would argue that this Leibnizian distinction between ‘nominal’ and ‘real’ 
definitions equates to that drawn by Peirce between ‘immediate’ and ‘dynamical’ 
objects. Peirce sees the ‘object’ that we initially encounter as the ‘immediate’ object 
and, as we saw above, he argues that it provides an initial ‘hint’ of the ‘dynamical’ 
object. The ‘immediate’ object is not a ‘representation’ in a Humean sense – it is 
not something that stands ‘in between’ our mind and a putative reality behind 
it. It is, rather, a “provisional” representation of what the object might eventually 
turn out to be. It is a ‘vague’ and a partial approximation of what the ‘dynamical 
object’ might evolve into as further determinations takes place. Bellucci is correct, 
therefore, in arguing that the distinction between ‘immediate’ and ‘dynamical’ 
objects is not the same as Frege’s distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung (Bellucci 
2015: 399–418). The latter distinction focusses on the object as it really is and 
the ways that we can express that reality; such a distinction exhibits an intrinsic 
nod in the direction of dualism. In Peirce’s and Leibniz’s framework, the ways in 
which we might express the reality of Bedeutung is not the main consideration – 
they are insisting upon a partial (and yet still true) approximation to reality. 
Deleuze also makes this distinction clear when, in his book on Leibniz, he talks 
of “perspectivism as a truth of relativity (and not a relativity of what is true)” 
(Deleuze 2003: 23).
 When Peirce claims that the ‘dynamical’ object is “outside of the sign” he 
insists that it is not a noumenal entity that exists ‘behind’ the ‘immediate’ object. 
In a letter to William James, he explains that he has deliberately not called the 
‘dynamical’ object the ‘real’ object:
We must distinguish between the Immediate Object, – i.e., the Object as represented 
in the Sign, – and the Real (no, because perhaps the Object is altogether fi ctive, I 
must choose a diff erent term; therefore:), say rather the Dynamical Object, which, 
from the nature of things, the Sign cannot express, which it can only indicate and 
leave the interpreter to fi nd out by collateral experience. (EP 2: 498)
The evolving ‘dynamical object’ is thus the ‘object’ in all of its potential, and 
relational, richness. It represents what we would know if we were omniscient, 
or if we had the time to consider an ‘object’ from all relational perspectives (via 
‘collateral experience’). And Peirce accepts, following Leibniz, that this level of 
knowledge can never be fully achieved – even suggesting that ‘no concepts, not 
even those of mathematics, are absolutely precise’ (CP 6.496).
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 In drawing this distinction, Peirce avoids using the term ‘real’ because he 
knows that it could be interpreted in a dualistic manner. This is why he calls it 
the ‘dynamical’ object rather than the ‘real’ object. He wants to emphasize the 
object’s ability to evolve from the ‘immediate’ object which is its initial source. 
Some commentators, however, do not fully appreciate Peirce’s desire to avoid 
this problem, and assume that Peirce does, after all, now admit of a reality that 
is separate from the knower. Short, for example, concludes that “The dynamic 
object is exactly that about which more can be learned. Therefore, it must be 
independent of our experience of it” (Short 2007: 199). Here Short slips from 
the correct idea that we have incomplete experience of the ‘dynamical’ object to 
the questionable conclusion that it must be ‘independent’ of us. This is mistaken 
because, paradoxically, it is the very fact that we are immersed in a relational web 
in which we are all connected which renders the ‘immediate’ object incomplete. 
Deledalle also misunderstands Peirce on this point. He agrees that knowledge of 
the ‘dynamical’ object is gained by ‘collateral experience’, and that such knowledge 
cannot be ‘direct knowledge of the dynamical object’ itself. But he concludes that 
Peirce must, as a result, admit of an ‘external existence’:
We must therefore, unless we fall back into idealism, admit the existence of an 
‘external’ object: the dynamical object, which is ‘as it is regardless of any particular 
aspect of it, the Object in such relations as unlimited and fi nal study would show 
it to be’ (CP 8.183). What is known is thus the relations of an existing object 
independent of ourselves in the course of the semioses in which we are, it and 
ourselves, engaged. (Deledalle 2000: 46)
Like Short, Deledalle takes the fact that we have no direct knowledge of the 
‘dynamical’ object to mean that it is ‘independent of ourselves’. Proni, likewise, 
asserts that the ‘dynamical object’ is equivalent to Kant’s noumenal reality: “The 
Dynamical Object is that which puts the whole process in motion, standing 
behind the scenes, unreachable in its completeness (as in Ding an Sich in Kant), 
but effective in its empirical existence” (Proni 2015: 19). And Greenlee reaches the 
same conclusion; the ‘dynamical’ object, for him, is construed as something ‘apart 
from relation to thought’: “The dynamical object is the represented thing, as it is in 
itself, apart from relation to thought, while that same thing, brought into relation 
to thought, is the ‘immediate’ object” (Greenlee 1973: 66).
 These interpretations are clearly some distance from the framework of partial, 
incomplete, and yet connected ‘objects’ which Peirce is advocating. Indeed, using 
Leibniz’s framework, we can now understand the ‘dynamical object’ as being the 
end point towards which the evolving ‘object of thought’ is always progressing. 
Hausman captures Peirce’s intent:
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While the Dynamic Object is not something that is itself revealed as a cognitive 
object, or as something given complete interpretative determination, it is some-
thing that would be so determined in an infi nite long-run, or if interpretation 
could reach an ideal limit in the infi nite future. (Hausman 1987: 388)
In summary, therefore, Peirce’s account of the ‘immediate’ and ‘dynamical’ object 
does not force him to commit to a form of dualism. In fact, it is further evidence 
that the ‘object’ evolves within the sign – beginning with the ‘immediate’ object. As 
its evolutionary path progresses the ‘immediate object’ becomes better defined – 
aided, of course, by the effects of secondness upon it. In this process, therefore, 
reality has a critical role to play in the development of our concepts – in contrast 
to the Hegelian contention that such progression can only be achieved through 
the logical workings of the mind. What Leibniz’s analysis of ‘nominal’ and ‘real’ 
definitions adds to our understanding of Peirce’s two ‘objects’, however, is that the 
‘dynamical’ object is never separate from us.
Conclusion
It could be argued that Peirce was a life-long critic of Hegelian philosophy. But 
this would be to overlook the substantial similarities that exist between them, at 
a general level, and in relation to the ‘object’ in the sign, in particular. As we have 
seen, the Peircean ‘object’ shares some key features with the Hegelian ‘Essence’. 
On this basis, it is possible to construe it as a posited, and mediating, element in 
Peirce’s triadic sign. It should not be viewed as an entity that is ‘behind’ the sign, 
or one which originates sign action. This interpretation also has the advantage of 
clarifying Peirce’s distinction between the ‘immediate’ and the ‘dynamical’ object – 
the latter is not a noumenal ‘object’ ‘behind’ the sign (or one that ‘compels’ it); 
rather it is the ‘object of thought’ that would be fully understood if we could take 
our experience to an infinite conclusion within an evolving web of conceptual 
relations. In this respect, it has been argued that Peirce’s position reflects Leibniz’s 
much older distinction between ‘nominal’ and ‘real’ definitions.
 However, the effect of placing the ‘object’ in a mediating position within the 
sign has further consequences. Firstly, the ‘object’ is now placed centre stage as 
the critical focus of the sign and, as it evolves, it results in new interpretants being 
formed.
 Secondly, in the Hegelian model, the ‘Essence’ develops in a dialectical manner 
that creates new concepts. If this template is transposed to the Peircean sign, we 
can reframe his semiotics in a more Hegelian light. Sign action, in this construal, 
becomes an on-going process of concept development – enabling us to develop and 
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refine our conceptual ‘tools’ to understand our world. This is in contrast to the 
semiotic tradition of the 20th century, inspired by Saussure, which tends to view 
signification as a process involving a class of culturally determined sense data 
which we interpret. The Peircean view, rejecting this position, argues that signs, 
in combination with each other, become the very means by which we fashion our 
empirical meanings. And rather than being viewed as the providers of ‘clues’ about 
‘noumenal’ objects, signs become, instead, the mechanisms which enable us to 
form our synthetic knowledge of the world.
 Thirdly, Peirce’s category of secondness gives reality a fundamental role 
in the formation of our ‘objects of thought’. As a result of this, ‘interpretation’ 
takes a more recessive role in meaning creation. In the Saussurian tradition, 
interpretations (entailed in ‘cultural codes’) play a key role in meaning creation. In 
Peircean semiotics, in contrast, it is the ‘Outward Clash’ that makes our concepts 
mean what they do. They are formed through a combination of our thinking and 
the actions of reality upon that thinking. The outcome, for Peirce, is a form of 
human knowledge that is quite distinct from that created by Hegel’s dialecticism, 
or by Kant’s intuitionism. Critically, Peirce’s model retains a strong element of the 
empiricism which is a hallmark of his thought.
 The scope of the present paper does not permit further discussion of how 
such synthetic knowledge is created through the combinatory actions of the icon, 
the index, and the symbol. Nor have we discussed how the inter-relationships of 
Peirce’s three categories and the elements of his triadic structure create these three 
specific sign types. It is hoped, however, that this discussion of the ‘object’, within 
the sign, has helped elucidate its role and the Peircean parallels which exist in 
relation to the philosophy of Hegel.
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Гегель и пирсовский «объект»
Семиотика Пирса хорошо известна тем, что она отстаивает триадическую, а не 
диадическую знаковую структуру, однако интерпретации того, как такая структура 
работает на практике, значительно варьируются. В данной работе утверждается, что 
«объект» Пирса является центральным для понимания философского замысла Пирса, 
и что он должен толковаться как промежуточный элемент внутри знака, а не как 
источник происхождения знака. Эта интерпретация перекликается с фундаментально 
антидуалистическим характером философии Пирса и с философией Дунса Скотта, 
которая оказала столь большое влияние на мышление Пирса. Более того, трактовка 
«объекта» как опосредованной единицы в знаке подчеркивает важные параллели с 
гегелевской мыслью и ролью «сущности» в диалектике последнего, приводя к мысли, 
что триадический знак Пирса имеет сильные гегелевские корни. Это существенно 
переосмысливает семиотику Пирса; она становится, как и в гегелевской диалектике, 
объяснением образования понятия. Всеобъемлющий каркас, в котором это происходит, 
сохраняет при этом эмпиризм Пирса и тем самым избегает опоры на логику, которая 
является определяющей характеристикой диалектического метода Гегеля.
Hegel ja peirce’ilik ‘objekt’
Peirce’i semiootika on tuntud selle poolest, et toetab pigem kolmetist kui kahetist märgi-
struktuuri, ent tõlgendused, kuidas seesugune struktuur praktikas töötab, on olnud erinevad. 
Käesolevas artiklis väidetakse, et peirce’ilik ‘objekt’ on kesksel kohal Peirce’i filosoofilise tahtluse 
mõistmisel ja et seda elementi tuleks pigem tõlgendada vahendava elemendina märgi sees kui 
märki tekitava allikana. See tõlgendus sobib Peirce’i filosoofia fundamentaalselt antidualistliku 
iseloomuga ning loob võimalikke läheduspunkte Peirce’ile tugevat mõju avaldanud Duns 
Scotuse keskaegse filosoofiaga. Veel enam, ‘objekti’ mõistmine vahendava üksusena märgi sees 
juhib tähelepanu olulistele paralleelidele hegelliku mõtlemisega ning „olemuse“ rollile viimase 
dialektikas. Nii väidetaksegi, et Peirce’i kolmetisel märgimatriitsil on tugevasti hegellikud 
juured. See positsioneerib Peirce’i semiootika oluliselt ümber; nagu Hegeli dialektikaski, saab 
sellest kontseptimoodustamise seletus. Kõikehõlmav raamistik, milles see aset leiab, jääb aga 
edasi Peirce’i empiritsistliku tausta juurde ning väldib seeläbi sõltuvust loogikast, mis on üks 
Hegeli dialektilist meetodit defineerivaid omadusi. 
